

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 AEC-11 CIAE-00 EUR-25 H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4535

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: NEW DRAFT PAPER ON AIR MANPOWER

REF: A) USNATO 4253; B) STATE 176622; C) USNATO 44550

1. WG CHAIRMAN HAS CIRCULATED NATO WIDE TO CAPITALS PAPER ON AIR MANPOWER (REF A) REVISED ON BASIS DISCUSSION AT AUGUST 14 WG MEETING (REF C). NEW DRAFT, TRANSMITTED BELOW NOTES IN PARA 8 THREE WAYS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR (AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REF B), BUT IT LISTS THEM AS A FRAME WORK FOR FUTURE STUDIES. A NUMBER OF CHANGES IN NEW DRAFT (PHRASE ADDED AT END OF PARA 5, REVISION OF PARA 6, SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 7, REFERENCE TO "DEGRADATION" BEFORE ITEMS LISTED IN PARA 11, PARA 13) HIGHLIGHT THE RISKS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR AND THE NEED FOR INTENSIVE STUDY OF ISSUES INVOLVED.

2. AT AUGUST 27 WG MEETING, WHERE CHAIRMAN HOPES REVISED DRAFT
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CAN BE APPROVED, WE PLAN IN ABSENCE OF NEW GUIDANCE TO QUESTION EMPHASIS ON RISKS AND NEED FOR INTENSIVE STUDIES INTRODUCED IN DRAFT BELOW.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON NEW DRAFT.

4. BEGIN TEXT

AGV(74)67

MBFR - IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS
OF NATO AND WP FORCES MANPOWER IN THE NGA AS OF MID-1974
- AIR FORCES -

INTRODUCTION

1. THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED(1) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED NATO ASSESSMENTS (2) AT MID-1974 OF NATO AND WP FORCES' MANPOWER IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA. THESE INCLUDE ESTIMATES, NOT HITHERTO AVAILABLE, OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER STRENGTHS: THESE ARE SHOWN AT ANNEX A.

2. THE WORKING GROUP ARE CONSIDERING, SEPARATELY, THE MILITARY/ TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVISED GROUND FORCE FIGURES(3); AND OF THE POSSIBILITIES(4) FOR ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN ANOMALIES BETWEEN THE MANNING PRACTICES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, DESIGNED TO INDUCE THE WP POWERS TO AGREE ON THE RANGE OF FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS.

3. THIS NOTE IS CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE AIR MANPOWER, BUT SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THOSE QUOTED ABOVE.

THE SITUATION

4. THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL(5) STATES THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL HAVE, HITHERTO, EXCLUDED OTHER FORCES (AIR AND NUCLEAR) FROM CONSIDERATION IN MBFR.
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NO FIRM ALLIANCE POSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN AS TO THE EVENTUAL INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS.

5. THE AD HOC GROUP VIENNA HAS SUGGESTED(6) THAT THE ALLIES CONSIDER THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THIS PROPOSAL HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY CONSIDERED SO FAR WITHIN THE ALLIANCE(7), AND THIS NOTE IS CONCERNED TO REVIEW THE BROAD ISSUES OF A MILITARY OR TECHNICAL NATURE WHICH WILL MERIT CONSIDERATION BEFORE ANY DECISION ON THE RELEASE OF MANPOWER DATA IS TAKEN.

PROBLEMS TO BE CONSIDERED

6. THE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS INVOLVE COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH WILL REQUIRE DETAILED STUDIES BEFORE ANY REASONABLE ASSESSMENT OF THEIR EFFECTS CAN BE JUDGED. THESE STUDIES WILL BE REQUIRED IN WHATEVER CONTEXT AIR MANPOWER MAY BE CONSIDERED WITHIN MBFR, WHETHER THE EXAMINATION IS CONCERNED TO EXAMINE THE OVERALL IMPLICATIONS OF INTRODUCING AIR FORCE ELEMENTS INTO THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS, OR TO DECIDE THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN A COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, OR IN ASSESSING THE POSSIBLE VALUE OF INCLUDING ELEMENTS OR AIR MANPOWER AS A MAKEWEIGHT FOR ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

7. BECAUSE THE ALLIANCE POSITION TO DATE HAS BEEN THAT MBFR SHOULD FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, STUDIES AND CONSULTATIONS HAVE CONCENTRATED ON THE EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS IN THOSE GROUND FORCES WITH NATO SEEKING TO BRING THE WP TO NEGOTIATE ON THAT BASIS. THUS THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT YET ADDRESSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCES IN ANY DETAIL, NOR, WITH ONE "MIXED PACKAGE" EXCEPTION, HAS ANY ASSESSMENT BEEN ATTEMPTED OF THE RISKS LIKELY TO BE ATTENDENT UPON SUCH REDUCTIONS. AN EXAMINATION HAS BEEN CONDUCTED AT EXPERT/MILITARY STAFF LEVEL (8) INTO THE CAPABILITIES AND AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS OF NATO TACTICAL AIR FORCES IN THE CENTRAL REGION AND THE REPORT OF THIS EXAMINATION WILL BE FINALISED SHORTLY. WHILST THIS REPORT MAY BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE
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GUIDANCE AND INSIGHTS INTO THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT THIS GUIDANCE CAN BE CONSIDERED DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO EFFECTS THAT COULD RESULT FROM REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER. HOWEVER, AS IS DISCUSSED BELOW, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR MANPOWER STRENGTHS ON THE ONE HAND AND NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENTS IN NATO AIR FORCES ON THE OTHER, IS SUCH THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF ONE INTO MBFR WILL ALMOST INEVITABLY EXPOSE THE OTHER FOR SIMILAR CONSIDERATION.

8. IT WILL BE APPARENT THAT ANY DECISION TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR WILL BRING WITH IT THE NEED FOR IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF

COMPLEX PROBLEM AREAS. IT WOULD THUS BE DESIRABLE TO STRUCTURE FUTURE CONSIDERATION WITHIN A FRAMEWORK DESIGNED TO OFFER A LOGICAL AND CONTROLLED APPROACH TO SUCH STUDIES. SUCH A FRAMEWORK MIGHT BE:

A. ADDITION TO AIR MANPOWER TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WITHOUT, IN PHASE I, ADDRESSING AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

B. SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE FOR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WITHIN AN

INTEGRATED AIR GROUND CEILING.

C. ALLOW FOR AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO PROVIDE A CEILING FOR
AIR MANPOWER DISTINCT FROM THAT RESULTING FROM GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

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REVIEW

9. THE AIR MANPOWER DATE OF THE NATO AND WP FORCES IN THE NGA ARE SET OUT AT ANNEX A. ALTHOUGH THESE ARE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL IN NUMBERS THIS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS PROVIDING ANY FIRM INDICATION OF COMPARATIVE COMBAT CAPABILITIES BECAUSE THE STRUCTURE OF THE OPPOSING AIR FORCES VARY WIDELY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NATO FIGURES INCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED ON GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS (29,000) AND SSMS (3,700) WHEREAS THESE DUTIES IN THE WP FORCES, (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE GDR GROUND-TO-AIR DEFENCES) ARE UNDERTAKEN BY GROUND FORCES. MOREOVER, MANY OF THE AIR FORCE ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY AIRMEN IN NATO ARE EFFECTED IN WP AIR FORCES BY GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL. IT IS, THEREFORE, NECESSARY TO CONSIDER ALSO THE RELATIVE AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS, AS SET OUT AT ANNEX B (TO BE ISSUED SEPARATELY) BEFORE ANY ATTEMPT IS MADE TO COMPARE RELATIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE AIR FORCES.

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10. IT MAY BE ARGUED THAT REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE A REDUCTION EITHER IN NUMBERS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT OR GROUND ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENTS, AND THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS COULD BE ABSORBED WITHIN ADMINISTRATIVE OR SUPPORT FUNCTIONS NOT BEARING IMMEDIATELY UPON OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. WHILST THIS IS THEORETICALLY TRUE IT OVERLOOKS THE FACT THAT THE OPERATION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IS A MANPOWER INTENSIVE PROCESS AND THAT A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THE INTENSITY AND TYPE OF OPERATIONS REQUIRED AND THE NUMBERS OF AIRMEN AVAILABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE MANY FUNCTIONS INVOLVED IN THE PREPARATION, SERVICING AND SUPPORT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENTS CARRYING OUT THOSE OPERATIONS. MOREOVER, BECAUSE NATO WILL CONDUCT AIR OPERATIONS IN WAR WITH THE AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENTS THAT ARE AVAILABLE IN PEACE IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PEACE AND WAR CAPABILITIES IN RESPECT OF AIRCRAFT NUMBERS, POSTURES AND STATES OF READINESS.

11. IT IS ALSO PERTINENT THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL STRINGENCY ON NATO AIR FORCES HAVE PROMOTED SOPHISTICATED MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AND OPTIMISED MANPOWER UTILISATION TO AN EXTENT WHERE THERE IS NOW PROBABLY LITTLE SCOPE FOR ABSORBING MANPOWER CUTS WITHOUT ENGENDERING A DEGRADATION OF CAPABILITY. SUCH A DEGRADATION COULD BE MANIFESTED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS:

A. REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE BOTH IN PEACE AND WAR.

B. INABILITY TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY (I.E. OPERATION IN ALL ROLES APPROPRIATE TO A PARTICULAR AIRCRAFT TYPE).

C. REDUCED READINESS STATES.

D. REDUCED TARGET COVERAGE.

E. LOWERING OF GENERAL TRAINING, (AND, BY IMPLICATION, OPERATIONAL) STANDARDS.

12. IN THE CASE OF STATIONED (CA-UK-US) AIR FORCES IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW ELEMENTS FROM THE NGA AND TO SECRET

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RETURN THEM IN AN EMERGENCY ON THE SAME SCALE WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME. THERE COULD BE, HOWEVER, SOME SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS ON THE FACTORS AT 11A - E ABOVE AND THESE COULD BE EXPECTED TO BEAR MORE HEAVILY ON THE STATIONED, AS DISTINCT FROM INDIGENOUS, FORCES BECAUSE OF THE NECESSARILY MORE NARROW SPECTRUM OF SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO THE FORMER. ONCE AGAIN SUCH EFFECTS COULD BE ADDUCED ONLY AFTER DETAILED EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHEITICAL WITHDRAWALS

OF SPECIFIED ELEMENTS.

13. THE FOREGOING EMPHASIZES THE COMPLEXITIES INHERENT IN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AIR MANPOWER AND OPERATIONAL AIR CAPABILITIES, AND POINTS THE NEED FOR CLOSE ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC ISSUES AS THEY ARISE. THE APPARENTLY SIMILAR STRENGTH FIGURES FOR THE NATO AND WP AIR FORCES (ANNEX A) MAY HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON THE DISPARITY ISSUE, BUT BEYOND THAT, FUTURE PROPOSALS FOR THEIR INCLUSION CANNOT BE FORECAST. MOREOVER, THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND FORCES CANNOT BE IGNORED AND WILL SERVE TO WIDEN THE SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS CALLING FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) AC/119-R(74)69
- (2) AC/276-D(74)6
- (3) AGV(74)55 (SITCEN 1903 DTG 191540Z JUL)
- (4) AGV(74)54 (SITCEN 1902 DTG 191035Z JUL)
- (5) NAC 2948 220945Z NOV 73 (SEE PO/73/154 20 NOV 73)
- (6) AHG REPORT TO NAC 5 APR 74 (US NATO/POL/OUT/NS-74-47, 8 APR 74)
- (7) ISD/70(FINAL)
- (8) AC/276(SGTA)-N/32(FINAL DRAFT)

ANNEX A

ASSESSMENTS OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AT MID-1974

TABLE I

WARSAW PACT		NATO	
USSR: GSFG	43,000	US	34,000
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NGF	15,500		
CGF	6,500		
TOTAL 65,000			
NSWP: GDR	39,000	NON-US: BE	19,500
POLAND	61,000	FRG	111,000
CSSR	43,500	FR	500 (PLUS)
	NL		20,000
TOTAL	143,500	SUB-TOTAL	151,000
	CA		1,500
	UK		10,000
GRAND TOTAL 208,500		GRAND TOTAL 196,000	

TABLE II ASSUMING REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES ONLY
(LIMITED TO 10 PER CENT FOR NATO)

WARSAW PACT NATO

REDUCTIONS

TO COMMON CEILING

WOULD BE 240,000 (952,000-712,000) 79,000 (791,000-712,000)

GROUND FORCE COMMON

CEILING TARGET 712,000 (ABOUT)

RESIDUAL TOTAL GROUND 908,000 DISPARITY 12,000

PLUS AIR MANPOWER 920,000

TABLE III ASSUMING CUMULATION GROUND/AIR MANPOWER AND REDUCTIONS

IF APPLIED AT 10 PER CENT TO NATO GROSS TOTALS

DISPARITY

GROUND FORCES 952,000 791,000 161,000

GROUND & AIR 1,160,000 987,000 173,000

ASSUMING MAX.

10 PER CENT REDUCTION

FOR NATO 99,000

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COMMON CEILING WOULD

NOT BE BELOW 888,000

THIS WOULD ENTAIL

REDUCTIONS OF 272,000 99,000

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